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La Tunisie, l'Égypte, on parle de la Jordanie, du Yémen et de l'Arabie Saoudite


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Khadafi, pour sa part, fait des appels à la télévision pour encourager ses loyalistes à sortir dans les rues et exterminer les "traîtres, rats au service des croisés occidentaux et de l'OTAN". Son appel, qui a été retracé, a été fait depuis la frontière algérienne.

The fall of Tripoli is near.

Est-ce que c'est bien les mots qu'il a employés? Quand j'étais au Cegep j'avais un prof d'histoire qui nous disais sans cesse que pour bon nombres de pays musulmans les croisades étaient encore un évènement très important et d'actualité et que c'était une bonne raison de la haine de certain extrémiste pour les occidentaux. J'ai toujours trouvé ce fait un peu irréel, mais si un dictateur comme Khadafi utilise ce terme pour "crinquer" sa population il y'a des questions à ce poser.

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Oui, ce sont les mots qu'il a employé.

Les révolutionnaires ont atteint le centre de la capitale et le Green Square où les célébrations pro-Khadafi avaient lieu. Maintenant ? C'est rempli de révolutionnaires et anti-Khadafi qui hurlent, chantent, tirent et klaxonnent. Les vidéos seront bientôt disponibles sur internet. La journaliste anglaise en diffuse déjà sur Sky News, mais c'est pas disponible ici.

Il n'y avait presque aucune résistance. Il reste certains endroits à dealer avec, mais c'est tout. Les quartiers se vident pour rejoindre les révolutionnaires dans les rues.

Saif Al-Islam, fils de Khadafi, a été capturé. D'autres ont fuit la ville.

Tripoli has fallen to revolutionnaries.

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Dis-moi, True Story. Est-ce que tu trouves que c'est une bonne chose ce qui se passe là-bas en ce moment?

Très. Cela devait arriver 20 ans plus tôt.

Il y a moins de combats et de résistance que prévu, ce qui limite le nombre de morts (bien que nombreux, malheureusement). Les gens sont dans les rues en train de célébrer (un peu hâtivement) et vivre un moment sans être surveillé ou réprimé par le régime Khadafiste. Ce moment n'a pas été vécu depuis 42 ans.

Donc oui, c'est vraiment une bonne chose. Le problème par contre va être la suite : néocolonialisme au service des puissances impérialistes pour rendre dette à l'aide offerte. Pour se faire, ce sera probablement le pétrole, la plus grande source de revenue du pays. Néanmoins, Khadafi est out. Enfin. ENFIN, TABARNACK.

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Le problème par contre va être la suite : néocolonialisme au service des puissances impérialistes pour rendre dette à l'aide offerte. Pour se faire, ce sera probablement le pétrole, la plus grande source de revenue du pays.

10-4

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La situation géopolitique dans le Nord-Ouest de la Libye :

800px-Tripolitanian_Front.svg.png

En rouge : les révolutionnaires (ou les agents de la CIA, al-Qaida si vous préférez)

En vert : les khadafistes (ou Le Peuple de la Révolution et du Leader Khadafi)

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Top Ten Myths about the Libya War

The Libyan Revolution has largely succeeded, and this is a moment of celebration, not only for Libyans but for a youth generation in the Arab world that has pursued a political opening across the region. The secret of the uprising’s final days of success lay in a popular revolt in the working-class districts of the capital, which did most of the hard work of throwing off the rule of secret police and military cliques. It succeeded so well that when revolutionary brigades entered the city from the west, many encountered little or no resistance, and they walked right into the center of the capital. Muammar Qaddafi was in hiding as I went to press, and three of his sons were in custody. Saif al-Islam Qaddafi had apparently been the de facto ruler of the country in recent years, so his capture signaled a checkmate. (Checkmate is a corruption of the Persian “shah maat,” the “king is confounded,” since chess came west from India via Iran). Checkmate.

The end game, wherein the people of Tripoli overthrew the Qaddafis and joined the opposition Transitional National Council, is the best case scenario that I had suggested was the most likely denouement for the revolution. I have been making this argument for some time, and it evoked a certain amount of incredulity when I said it in a lecture in the Netherlands in mid-June, but it has all along been my best guess that things would end the way they have. I got it right where others did not because my premises turned out to be sounder, i.e., that Qaddafi had lost popular support across the board and was in power only through main force. Once enough of his heavy weapons capability was disrupted, and his fuel and ammunition supplies blocked, the underlying hostility of the common people to the regime could again manifest itself, as it had in February. I was moreover convinced that the generality of Libyans were attracted by the revolution and by the idea of a political opening, and that there was no great danger to national unity here.

I do not mean to underestimate the challenges that still lie ahead– mopping up operations against regime loyalists, reestablishing law and order in cities that have seen popular revolutions, reconstituting police and the national army, moving the Transitional National Council to Tripoli, founding political parties, and building a new, parliamentary regime. Even in much more institutionalized and less clan-based societies such as Tunisia and Egypt, these tasks have proved anything but easy. But it would be wrong, in this moment of triumph for the Libyan Second Republic, to dwell on the difficulties to come. Libyans deserve a moment of exultation.

I have taken a lot of heat for my support of the revolution and of the United Nations-authorized intervention by the Arab League and NATO that kept it from being crushed. I haven’t taken nearly as much heat as the youth of Misrata who fought off Qaddafi’s tank barrages, though, so it is OK. I hate war, having actually lived through one in Lebanon, and I hate the idea of people being killed. My critics who imagined me thrilling at NATO bombing raids were just being cruel. But here I agree with President Obama and his citation of Reinhold Niebuhr. You can’t protect all victims of mass murder everywhere all the time. But where you can do some good, you should do it, even if you cannot do all good. I mourn the deaths of all the people who died in this revolution, especially since many of the Qaddafi brigades were clearly coerced (they deserted in large numbers as soon as they felt it safe). But it was clear to me that Qaddafi was not a man to compromise, and that his military machine would mow down the revolutionaries if it were allowed to.

Moreover, those who question whether there were US interests in Libya seem to me a little blind. The US has an interest in there not being massacres of people for merely exercising their right to free assembly. The US has an interest in a lawful world order, and therefore in the United Nations Security Council resolution demanding that Libyans be protected from their murderous government. The US has an interest in its NATO alliance, and NATO allies France and Britain felt strongly about this intervention. The US has a deep interest in the fate of Egypt, and what happened in Libya would have affected Egypt (Qaddafi allegedly had high Egyptian officials on his payroll).

Given the controversies about the revolution, it is worthwhile reviewing the myths about the Libyan Revolution that led so many observers to make so many fantastic or just mistaken assertions about it.

[...]

Source À lire pour cesser de croire à n'importe quoi. L'auteur résume bien tout ce qui s'est passé.

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Situation dans Tripoli :

Le complexe militaire Bab Al-Ziziyah a été complètement libéré par les révolutionnaires. C'était le lieu fétiche où Khadafi faisait ses discours et apparitions publiques. Aujourd'hui, il y a moins d'une heure, les révolutionnaires ont détruire la tête d'un important monument de Khadafi dans le complexe. Les révolutionnaires s'amusaient à le piétiner, et d'autres à déchirer des posters de Khadafi en plein complexe. Du jamais vu en 42 ans. Néanmoins, il reste les tunnels à nettoyer.

L'hotel international de Rixos est encore sous contrôle khadafiste et plusieurs figures importantes du régime, dont Saif al-Islam le petit laid, résident. Le problème c'est qu'il y a plein de journalistes internationaux là-bas, alors ce sera difficile. Or, il est possible d'affirmer que la capitale est libérée à plus de 90%. Il ne reste que certains loyalistes qui terrorisent les quartiers et les tireurs d'élite sur les toits de quelques bâtiments.

800px-Tripoli_uprising.svg.png

Situation dans le Nord-Est du pays :

800px-Tripolitanian_Front.svg.png

Situation dans le golfe de Sirte :

800px-Gulf_of_Sirt_Front.svg.png

Un envoyé de l'ONU a dit que le pays devrait être libéré de Khadafi et sa bourgeoisie dans moins de 72 heures.

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Une petite idée des horreurs et conflits dans les rangs des khadafistes.

Gaddafi's Fleeing Mercenaries Describe the Collapse of the Regime

Right from the start, Mario, an ethnic Croatian artillery specialist from Bosnia, suspected it was a lost cause.

"My men were mainly from the south [of Libya] and Chad, and there were a few others from countries south of Libya," said Mario, who spoke on condition that his last name not be published. A veteran of the wars of the former Yugoslavia, he had been hired by the Gaddafi regime to help fight the rebels and, later, NATO. "Discipline was bad, and they were too stupid to learn anything. But things were O.K. until the air strikes commenced. The other side was equally bad, if not worse. [Muammar] Gaddafi would have smashed the rebels had the West not intervened."

By early July, Mario said, more than 30% of the men under his command had deserted or defected to the rebel side. NATO missiles scored several direct hits on his forces, causing "significant casualties." At that point in the war, he said, "military hardware stopped having the role it [once did]. We had to use camouflage and avoid open spaces."

Away from the front, at the heart of the regime, mistrust and excess further undermined Gaddafi's hold on power, Mario said. "Life in [Gaddafi's] compound and shelters was so surreal, with partying, women, alcohol and drugs," said Mario, 41. "One of the relatives of Gaddafi took me to one of his villas where they offered me anything I wanted. I heard stories about people being shot for fun and forced to play Russian roulette while spectators were making bets, like in the movies."

Tension between two of Gaddafi's sons contributed to the sense that Gaddafi's cause was doomed. "I noticed profound rivalry between Gaddafi's sons," Mario said, speaking en route from the southern city of Sabha to Libya's border with Niger. "Once, there was almost an armed clash between Mohammed's and Saif [al-Islam]'s men. I saw one group interrogating the other at gunpoint, and then more of the other group arrived fully armed, and it was a standoff for several minutes, with both sides cursing each other."

Mario respected and liked Gaddafi's most prominent son, Saif al-Islam, who in 2009 threw himself a lavish 37th birthday party on the coast of the former Yugoslav republic of Montenegro, one of Europe's newest glamour spots for the superrich. The ties between the Gaddafi family and the former Yugoslavia stretch back to the days of Josep Broz Tito, Yugoslavia's storied communist leader, who was a friend and ally of Gaddafi's. Mario said that Gaddafi had hired several former Yugoslav fighters, most of them Serbs, to help him in his fight against NATO and the rebels. One by one, Mario said, these foreign advisers and commanders left Tripoli. Some senior Libyans joined them.

"I noticed that many Libyans pretended loyalty just out of fear and were just seeking a way to turn against [Gaddafi]," Mario said. "Many officers admitted to me they stood no chance against NATO, and one of them told me he was in touch with the people in Benghazi." Benghazi is the rebel stronghold in the east of the country.

Mario left Tripoli 12 days ago after receiving a warning from a comrade. "Two weeks ago, a friend who brought me here told me I should leave Tripoli, as things were going to rapidly change and that deals have been made," he said. He noticed Gaddafi's South African mercenaries beginning to leave. Mario decided with a fellow mercenary to flee Tripoli. "I tried to get ahold of Saif before that, but he was beyond reach," he said. "Later he called my companion to ask if we needed something and to say that they would win back all of Libya."

Another former Yugoslav soldier, a retired general in the old Yugoslav army and a longtime military adviser to Gaddafi, cut things tighter, leaving Tripoli on Aug. 21. The man, who spoke on condition that his name not be published, spoke to TIME as he traveled through Libya toward Tunisia. "Back there is chaos," he said, referring to Tripoli, which was then being overrun by the rebel forces. "The whole system has collapsed. I knew it was coming. I haven't spoken to [Gaddafi] in four weeks. He wouldn't listen."

Like Mario, the former general had sensed that the regime would soon fall. "Everything seemed normal until recently, but we could feel the deal breaking behind the stage," he said. The former general, who had lived in Tripoli and ran a business there for many years, described Gaddafi as a "fool" and compared him to Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian leader who took on NATO during the 1999 war in Kosovo and ultimately died in a prison cell at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague. "You can't fight NATO and play a stubborn lunatic like that guy," the former general said.

(Source)

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La violence gratuite commise par les mercenaires Touarègues du Mali et environs. C'est vraiment dégueulasse.

TIMBUKTU, Mali — Last month at a guesthouse within sight of the rolling dunes of the open Sahara, I sat down to await one of Muammar Qaddafi’s mercenaries. Through an intermediary he agreed to meet and explain why the Tuareg — an ancient Saharan people who inhabit large desert swathes of Libya, Mali, Niger, and Algeria — would help the Libyan leader crush the democracy protests — including unarmed civilians, women, and children — and eventually join in all-out war against the ensuing rebellion

I learned about him when a Tuareg elder told me that in recent weeks more than 200 Tuareg fighters had returned from Libya to Timbuktu and the surrounding villages. He said that hundreds more had returned to other towns in eastern Mali. Local leaders were worried, he said, that these men could be the leading edge of a large wave of mercenaries returning from the fighting in Libya and that they could set a match to northern Mali’s own brittle mixture of ethnic rivalries.

For decades Qaddafi has recruited the Tuareg — long renowned for their desert-fighting prowess — to serve in his military. In the early 1980s, the Libyan leader called them to join his Islamic Legion, which he styled as the military cornerstone for his dream of building a united Muslim state in North Africa. But after ill-fated military adventures in Lebanon, Chad, and Sudan, he disbanded the legion and invited the Tuareg to join special brigades within the Libyan army. In recent decades, various Tuareg rebel groups, many of them trained in these Libyan units, have fought in neighboring Mali and Niger. After each of these conflicts was settled, Qaddafi provided aid and shelter to the rebel leaders and many of their former combatants.

Given this history, it wasn’t surprising in March when reports surfaced that Qaddafi was offering upwards of one thousand U.S. dollars a day for Tuareg to help his regime put down the festering rebellion. Officials from Mali and Niger reported convoys of vehicles bearing hundreds of Tuareg men streaming northeast toward Libya.

Now, five months later, as these men returned from the frontlines of the Libyan civil war, most were reluctant to discuss their experiences, especially with a Westerner. Some of them lectured me on the fallacy of American foreign policy in North Africa. “Hasn’t Obama seen what happened to Iraq when Saddam was gone?” one asked. “Does America want another Afghanistan?” inveighed another. “Why is the United States interfering in the internal affairs of Libya?” railed a third, who, as a Malian who fought in Libya, failed to see any irony in his question.

Finally, the mercenary arrived for our meeting. His long, lean build resembled that of a hardscrabble farmer more than a warrior. He wore a frayed, brown bagzan (the long, loose shirt favored by locals), battered camel-leather sandals, and a black turban covering his nose and mouth, in the traditional Tuareg style. He suggested we go up to the roof of the guesthouse to drink hot sweet tea and take advantage of the breeze blowing in from the desert.

The man — I will call him Abdullah — agreed to tell his story in detail if I promised not to identify him or his family. “I am not afraid to tell the truth,” he said, but he worried Mali officials or his fellow fighters might not approve.

He is a knot of inscrutable contradictions — a Tuareg who has been on both sides of rebellion. As a boy, he said he had fled Timbuktu in the early 1990s with his family when the army attacked the city, which some in the Mali government at the time claimed was teeming with rebels and their sympathizers. He saw homes demolished by tank shells, knew political leaders who were shot, and women and children who were killed. Yet, as an adult, he chose to fight for Muammar Qaddafi against the Libyan rebels, albeit mostly for money.

To prove he had been in Libya he produced a document — with a passport photo attached and a stamp from the Malian consulate in Tamanrasset — identifying him as a refugee from Libya. He said that that he went to Libya in 2007 with his wife and children. They were given short-term residence papers in exchange for his enlistment in the Libyan army. He was assigned to a Tuareg brigade in the southern town of Awbari.

Two years ago, he was granted full residency status. In addition to the 1,500 dinars (about $1,300) he was paid per month — much of which he sent back to family living in small encampments near Timbuktu — his wife and children received free medical care, and his children went to a Libyan school. “A very good school,” he said. He was promised a house and a car if he stayed in the army. “They always promised a house and a car, but very few Tuareg ever got them,” he said. “I think Qaddafi tried very hard to keep the Tuareg in Libya. I think he smelled something was coming.”

When the protests began in Tripoli, his unit was attached to the infamous 32nd brigade, led by Qaddafi’s son Khamis, and was sent to disperse the unarmed marchers. “That was easy,” he said with startling nonchalance. “We would kill three or four in the front of the crowd and they all ran away. It was very easy.”

After Tripoli, he and his fellow Tuareg mercenaries fought in several battles east of the capital city along the coast, including at Misrata. As the fighting intensified, Libyan officials began rounding up Tuareg living in Libya, threatening to imprison them and their families if they didn’t join the fight, though many had no military training. Some deserted and joined the rebels, but most stayed with the forces loyal to Qaddafi. At Misrata, he said he saw Ibrahim Bahanga, one of the Tuareg who led the rebellion against the Mali government from 2007 through 2009. “He was with many former rebels from Mali. They were fighting hard for Qaddafi.”

Abdullah’s unit moved on to Brega and then to the outskirts of Benghazi. “We were six kilometers [about four miles] from Benghazi when the first NATO bombs hit us.” First, a missile hit a vehicle carrying an artillery piece near his position and killed eight men. “We never heard it or saw it. The men just blew up.” He and his fellow soldiers were spooked. They were well trained to fight on the ground, he said. “None of us was good at shooting down airplanes.” Men tried to hide under cars and under tree branches. When night fell, they drove without lights. When they stopped to sleep, they dug foxholes far from their vehicles.

At first, the word came down that Qaddafi had ordered his forces not to shoot at the planes. “He said he would show the world that he wanted a peaceful solution. It was a strategy to make people ask their leaders ‘why are you fighting Qaddafi? He isn’t fighting you.’ But it didn’t work and then it was too late for us to fight back.”

I asked about Qaddafi’s February speech, in which he pledged to hunt down protesters house by house and what his men were ordered to do if they encountered civilians. He paused before answering, “To be honest, it is true. We believed what Qaddafi told us. We believed we would go there and kill everyone.”

I asked if he had seen any civilians killed. In Misrata, he says, “We tried to find everyone there. One half of the city was cleaned.”

“What do you mean ‘cleaned?’” I asked.

“The people were killed. Women, children, everyone there.”

Who did the killing?

“Mostly it was Arabs but also some Tuareg.”

Did you kill any civilians?

“No.” He refused to elaborate.

I asked about accusations that Qaddafi’s forces had raped women. “I never saw that,” he said. But his unit found a group of women who claimed to have been raped by men from Sudan and Egypt who had been fighting with rebels.

Et il y a encore des trous du cul pour supporter Khadafi ...

Source - la suite (page 2)

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(modifié)

J'sais pas pourquoi tu prends ça tant à coeur. Peu importe le régime qui sera instauré, ça ne sera pas celui dont tu rêves. (Je sais que tu le sais.)

Qu'est-ce ça peut t'foutre que ça soit un autre à la place de Khadafi, ou une "démocratie à l'Iranienne" ou bien une "république" à l'Occidentale, ou ou ou... ? J'ai pas entendu un seul révolutionnaire libyen vouloir abolir la propriété privé à ce que je sache.

Modifié par Majoras
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